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Substance and Form
in Scientific Evidence:
What Daubert Didn't Do

Samuel R. Gross·

On its face, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phannaceuticals 1 was about a easy
a case as the Supreme Court gets. The plaintiff claimed that their
birth defect were caused by the anti-nau ea drug Bendectin, which their
mothers had used during their gestation. In response to a motion for
summary judgment by the defendant, the plaintiff pre ented affidavits of
eight expert witnes e who offered their opinion - ba ed on a variety of
studies- that Bendectin was indeed the culprit. The federal di trict court
that heard the motion granted summary judgment to the defendant, and
th
ioth Circuit affirmed. Both lower court held that critical portions of
the plaintiff ' evidence were inadmi ible, and that without that evidence
the plaintiffs had not met their burden of producing ufficient evidence
to present a genuine factual dispute. The first holding - that this expert
evidence was inadmi sible - was the sole i ue in the Supreme Court.
The que tion is governed by Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence:

If cientific, technical, or other pecialized knowledg will a ist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witne qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwi e.
•professor, University of Michigan School of Law. This chapter has benefited from
advice and comments by David Garabrandt, Heidi Feldman, Richard Friedman,
Robert Harris and Richard Lempert, and from excellent research assistance from
ancy Laetham, Kristina Maritczac and Nancy Vettorello. The research was
supported by the Cook unds of the University of Michigan School of Law.
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Was this a case in which scientific knowledge would "assist the trier of
fact"? Certainly. Were the plaintiffs' witnesses qualified by "knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education" to testify as experts? That was
uncontested. Were there any other requirements that these witnesses had
to satisfy? Arguably - plausibly- the term "knowledge," scientific knowledge, implies that the experts' testimony must be based on scientific
information - which it was. Arguably, also, their evidence was subject
to the re quirement in Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence that
the information on which an expert opinion is based, if it is not itself
admissible in evidence, must be "of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject." Would a reasonable scientist who was assessing the possibility
that a drug produces birth defects rely on the sort of information these
experts used? That too was not in dispute; in fact, the defendant's experts
used much of the same data themselves.
Why then did two lower courts erroneously exclude this evidence?
Why was Supreme Court review necessary? Why did this case attract
22 briefs amicus curiae and an unusual amount of publicity, even by
Supreme Cou rt standards?
For the most part, the defendant in Daubert, the lower courts, and the
amici curiae, were all concerned with issues other than whether this sort
of evidence is admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. There
were several additional questions hovering around the case, of greater
or lesser importance and generality, and much of the debate and the
anxiety were directed at these other questions: (1) Does Bendectin in
fact cause birth defects in human beings? The scientific consensus on
this question is that Bendectin probably does not cause birth defects,
and that certainly there is no substantial evidence that it does. (2) Do
juries answer such questions correctly? Many people contend that juries sometimes, perhaps frequently, make te rrible mistakes in deaJing
with scientific issues in general, and with causation in toxic torts cases
in particular. Juries have obviously been wrong on Bendectin at least
several times, if for no other reason because they have reached inconsistent verdicts in different cases. (3) ls the danger of such errors - and
the resulting risk of legal liability - wreaking havoc in the American
pharmaceutical industry or in American manufacturing generally? Some
people contend that product liability litigation based on bogus science
is destroying our international competitiveness. (4) Can we do anything
to help juries get scientific questions right? Perhaps some new rule of
evidence or procedure would improve matters. (5) Should juries decide
such issues at all? Does it make sense to entrust scientific questions to
ad-hoc tribunals of lay people? And if not juries, who should do it?
Judges? Medical or scientific experts? Administrative bodies?
These issues were not before the Supreme Court, but they might have
been affected by its opinion. Supreme Court opinions often make law
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well beyond the specific questions at hand. In this case that seemed
particularly likely, since the Court rarely addresses the problems of
scientific evidence. It didn't happen.
The good news about Daubert is that the Supreme Court got it right. It
understood the technical issue presented by the case, and it wrote about
as useful an opinion as possible given the structure of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. The bad news is that (as with most easy cases) the Cou rt
did little. Its decision is not likely to change practice much, and it will
not have any major effect on the important side issues that generated
most of the beat.
The problem with Daubert is that it deals with form rather than content,
the admissibility rather than the sufficiency or accuracy of the scientific
evidence. The underlying substantive question is simple: How strong is
the evidence that Bendectin causes birth defects? On that factual issue
as well Daubert was an easy case, but in the opposite (anti-plaintiff)
direction. By the time the District Court issued its opinion there was
a clear scientific consensus that Bendectin is safe, or in any event that
there is no substantial evidence to the contrary.
The lower courts that have handled Beodectin cases have been influenced by the substance of the evidence, and their decisions have come
to reflect the consensus among scientists. In recent years they have uniform ly judged the evidence against Bendectin lacking, and have held for
the defendant. But they have done so by subterfuge, claiming that the
plaintiff's evidence is legally insufficient under the standard that applies
to motions for summary judgment, or that it is inadmissible altogether.
Neither rationale is consistent with the usual rules that apply to these
procedural issues.
I have no quarrel with the courts' judgment in the Bendectin cases,
but their methods are unfortunate. Instead of distorting procedural law
they ought to say directly what they are really doing: ruling on the
factual merits of a scientific claim. In an easy case-and Daubert certainly
qualifies-this would amount to nothing more than an application of the
well established doctrine of "legislative fact finding." On other scientific
issues the evidence is often less one-sided, and the outcome less obvious.
Even so, courts may do well to extend the practice of substantive judicial
decision making to some harder scientific issues, provided they do it
explicitly and with great care. In all cases, courts will do better by adding
reliable scientific evidence from trustworthy sources than by excluding
evidence they consider unreliable.

I. Daubert and the Bendectf n Cases
Daubert was a late Bendectin cases. Bendectin is the brand name for
an anti-nausea drug that was marketed by the Richardson-Merrell pharmaceutical company ("Merrell") from 1956 until 1983. 2 It was widely
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prescribed for morning sickness; in the 1960s and '70s Bendectin was
taken by perhaps as many of 25% of all pregnant women in the United
States.3 In January 1977 a lawsuit was filed on behalf of David Mekdeci,
who was born with missing and malformed fingers and a missing pectoral
muscle. The suit alleged that these birth defects were caused by the
Bendectin that was prescribed to his mother while she was carrying him.
This was the first Bendectin case; it ended in 1981, after a retrial, with
a defense verdict that was upheld on appeal. 4 Between 1980 and 1991
about 1,700 additional Bendectin cases were filed, some thirty trials were
held, and several dozen decisions were published by state and federal
courts.5 By December 1991, however, when the Ninth Circuit issued its
Daubert opinion, this spate of litigation was all but completely over.
The Bendectin cases, as a group, constitute one of several recent
examples of mass toxic tort litigation. As mass toxic tort litigation goes,
Bendectin is a neat and inviting subject for study, because the entire
lifespan of the issue covered a mere dozen years. Asbestos litigation, by
contrast, bas been going on for decades, with no end in sight. Three
inter-related reasons made it possible to dispose of the Bendectin claims
with such relative dispatch. First, the alleged harm has a short latency; it
is apparent at the birth of the plaintiff, which is necessarily within nine
months of the use of the drug. For other toxic substances-asbestos, for
example, or the drug DES6 - ill effects may not be apparent until ten or
twenty or fifty years after exposure. Therefore it was comparatively easy to
identify potential plaintiffs quickly. Second, because of this short latency,
the claim that Bendectin causes birth defects was also comparatively easy
to examine; the studies can be completed in months rather than years
or decades. As a result, and also because of the intense legal interest
in the issue, Bendectin was studied with uncommon intensity. 7 Third,
the clear conclusion from the large body of scientific evidence that had
accumulated by the mid-1980's was that Bendectin does not cause birth
defects. 8
There is no need for an extensive history of the Bendectin litigation
in this context. It is not important to the issues in Daubert, and a
detailed and excellent description of the life cycle of this set of cases
has been already published by Professor Joseph Sanders, on whose work
this section is largely based.9 A synopsis of the highlights, however, will
be useful.
The next Bendectin trial (after Mekdeci) was Oxendine v. Me"ell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 10 which was tried in the Superior Court for the District
of Columbia in May 1983. In Oxendine the jury awarded the plaintiff
$750,000, the trial judge entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
in favor of the defendant, and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
reversed the j.n.o.v. and reinstated the jury's verdict. Oxendine remains
the only Bendectin case in which a verdict against Merrell bas been
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sustained on appeal. In the meantime, starting in February 1982, all
Bendectin cases that were pending in federal courts were consolidated for
pretrial discovery before Judge Carl A. Rubin of the Southern District of
Ohio (the home district of M errell). Eventually most of these cases-818
out of 1,186- were consolidated before Judge Rubin for trial as well as
discovery. 11 Judge Rubin ordered a trifurcated joint trial, which began
in February 1985. The first part was restricted to general causation:
does Bendectin cause any birth defects in humans? A jury found that
it does not, which ended the proceedings. In September 1985, Judge
Rubin denied the plaintiffs' motions for j.n.o.v. or a new trial; 12 three
years later the judgment for the defendant was upheld on appeal. 13
There have been some 24 trials and retrials of Bendectin cases since
the joint trial before Judge Rubin. 14 They have produced two hung juries,
one mistrial, fourteen defense verdicts, and seven plaintiff's verdicts- of
which five have been reversed and two are pending on appeal. In three
of the reversals, a federal circuit court granted a j.n.o.v. to the defendant,
or upheld a j.n.o.v. by the trial court, on the grounds that the plaintiff's
expert evidence on the issue of general causation was either inadmissible
or insufficient as a matte r of law, 15 and in a fourth reversal a j.n.o.v.
was remanded for reconsideration in light of Daubert. 16 By one route
or another, several federal circuits in succession decided that on the
existing state of the scientific evide nce, Bendectin claims cou ld not be
maintained: the First Circuit and the D.C. Circuit in 1987,17 the Fifth
Circuit in 1989, 18 the Sixth Circuit in 1992. 19 As this pattern emerged,
trial court judges became more willing to short-circuit the process by
granting pre-trial motions for summary judgment on the same grounds.20
Not surprisingly, trials became increasingly rare. There was one Bendectin
trial in 1985 (in addition to the joint trial), seven in 1986, eleven in 1987,
three in 1988, none in 1989, two in 1990, one in 1991 and none since.21
Initially, Daubert fit right into this pattern. Judge Earl Gilliam of
the United States District Court for the Southern District of California
granted a defense motion for summary judgment in November 1989. 22
Like other late Bendectin opinions, Judge Gilliam's consists primarily
of a review of the evidence on general causation, in the context of
earlier opinions on the same issue dealing with much the same evidence.
Briefly: There are four types of scientific studies that are commonly
used to determine whether a substa nce has toxic consequences: 23 analyses of the chemical structure of the compound that focus on similarities between it and known toxins; in vitro tests that examine its
e ffects on human or animal cells that are cultivated in the laboratory
for this purpose; in vivo studies that test its effects on laboratory animals; and epidemiological studies that examine its effects on human
beings. There is general agreement that epidemiological studies are the
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best a nd most informative, since only they p rovide direct evidence on
the occurrence o f pathologies in people. U nfortunately, epidemio logical
stud ies are also conside rably slower and more expensive than in vitro
or in vivo studies. Our advanced industrial econo my p roduces thousands of potentially toxic substances; for many (perhaps most) there
are no epidemiological studies at all. Bendectin is different. It has
been heavily studied, fo r several reasons- because it's a regulated drug
that required FDA approval before marketing, because the effect at
issue is comparatively easy to test, and because of the interest generated by litigatio n. By 1985, thirty-seven epidemio logical studies of
the relationship between Bendectin and human birth defects had been
p ublished; in 1989 one more appeared.24 In none of these studies did
the researchers conclude that Bendectin is a te ratogen, a substance
that causes bir th defects. In six the authors reported some relationship
between the d rug and one or more types o f birth defects, but concluded that their evidence was insufficient to show causal connection.
In the remaining thirty-two studies, they drew no conclusion about the
teratogenic effects of Be ndectin or affirmatively concluded that it has
none. 25
This state of the evide nce was presented to Judge G illiam in affidavi ts fro m expert witnesses submitted by Me rre ll in s upport of its
motion for summary judgment. The plainti ffs responded with affidavits
from e ight exper ts of the ir own. The District Court held, in two stages,
that the evidence offered by the plaintiffs was inadmissible. (1) Several experts concluded that Bendectin causes birth defects o n the basis of their evaluations of its chemical structure, a nd o n in vitro and
in vivo studies. Judge G illiam, following cases in o ther circuits, concluded that in the absence of "statistically significant epide mio logical
evide nce" in support, such expert opinions were inadmissible because
they "lack[) the sufficient found atio n necessary under FRE 703"26 in o ther words, because experts in their fields would no t "reasonably rely" on such data to reach a co nclusio n such as this. (2) One
of the plaintiffs experts, however, also based his opinion o n a reana lysis of previously published epidemiological d ata. Despite the fact
that t he expert claimed to have fo und a statistically significant relationship between Bendectin and birth defects, Judge Gilliam he ld
that this evidence was " insufficient to take this matter to the jury" 27
because the claim was too vague, and because it was "never published or subjected to peer review."28 Judge Gilliam seemed to say
that this final expert opinion, like the others, was inadmissible under FRE 703, but he could also be read to mean that a ltho ugh it
was admissible, it was insufficient to raise a question fo r the jury to
decide.29
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II. Daubert and the Frye Rule

A. The Ninth Circuit Opinion
The District Court opinion in Daubert was in line with the trend in Bendectin cases. Judge Gilliam granted summary judgment to the defendant
on narrow grounds. His opinion could conceivably mean that statistically
significant epidemiological evidence is required in every toxic tort case.
Or it could simply mean that the evidence offered by the plaintiff was
inadmissible in this case because, given the wealth of negative epidemiological data on Bendectin, no expert could reasonably conclude that
Bendectin is a teratogen on the basis of the limited data these experts
relied on. Either way, the impact of the opinion, like that of other
trial-court and appellate opinions in Bendectin cases, was limited to one
claim, or to a single class of claims. lt did nothing to restrict the use of
expert evidence in general.
The Ninth Circuit opinion in Daubert is a sharp departure from this
pattern.30 The court (in an opinion by Judge Alex Kozinski) begins its
legal analysis by restating and relying on a general evidentiary rule, the
rule that the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia announced in
1923 in United States v. Frye: 31 The issue in Frye was the admissibility
of a "systolic blood pressure deception test," a primitive precursor of
the modern polygraph. The District of Columbia Circuit laid down the
standard:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and the demonstrable is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight the evidential force of the principle must
be recognized ... [but] the thing from which the deduction is made
must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance
in the particular field in which it belongs.32
Although the Frye rule had been a controversial element of American
evidence law on expert evidence for nearly seventy years, it played
essentially no role in the Bendectin litigation up to that point. Frye
was cited only once in the half-dozen circuit court Bendectin opinions
preceding Daubert: in DeLuca v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 33 the
Third Circuit noted that it had rejected the Frye test. This is hardly
surprising. Whatever the cryptic "general acceptance" test means, its
range was always understood to be restricted to the type of issue that was
presented in Frye itself, the admissibility of novel scientific evidence. But
there was nothing novel about the plaintiffs' expert evidence in Daubert,
or any of the other Bendectin cases; on the contrary, both the data and
the modes of analysis were tried and true, old hat. The problem was
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a different one - simply that it seemed quite clear that the plaintiffs'
experts were wrong.
The Ninth Circuit begins its discussion of the evidence in Daubert by
adopting a principle it derives from other circuit court Bendectin cases:
"animal and chemical studies ... [are] insufficient to establish a link
between Bendectin and birth defects."34 That leaves the reanalysis of
published epidemiological studies as the plaintiffs' last hope. For that
item, the court invokes the Frye standard,35 with a twist. As a mode of
scientific investigation, reanalysis of published data is neither novel nor
controversial; but that is not enough:
[T]he reanalysis of epidemiological studies is generally accepted
by the scientific community only when it is subjected to verification
and scrutiny by others in the field .... Plaintiffs' reanalyses do not
comply with this standard: they were unpublished, not subjected to
the normal peer review process, and generated solely for use in
litigation.36
Does this mean that under the Ninth Circuit's inte rpretation of Frye,
peer review and publication are general prerequisites for the admissibility
of scientific evidence? The opinion doesn't quite say so, but a couple of
passages do suggest that reading. The court says that to be admissible
the evidence "must meet all of the essential requirements" "imposed by
the scientific community," and it quotes a passage from a muckraking
book on "junk science in the courtroom:"
fT)he best test of certainty we have is good science- the science
of publication, replication, and verification, the science of consensus
and peer review. 37
Judge Kozinski's opinion in Daubert is poorly reasoned and carelessly
written. If it means what it seems to mean, it might have changed the
use of scientific evidence in a big way. Frye said that evide nce based on
novel scientific techniques is inadmissible until the basic principles and
technology have become "generally accepted." Kozinski suggests that
every scientific finding that an expert witness relies on - and perhaps
every conclusion the expert testifies to- must be "generally accepted," as
demonstrated by publication in a peer-reviewed journal. This would have
been a vast extension of Frye, and it would have been utterly unworkable.
Peer review is the procedure by which articles are evaluated for possible
publication in scientific journals. It is an extremely useful institution for
the purposes for which it was designed, but not as a test fo r admissibility
in court. Given the Supre me Court decision in Daubert, I will mention
only some of the objections to the peer-review version of Frye, and only
in the briefest passing.38
(1) Peer review is not a substantive evalua tion of the truth of the
findings reported in the scientific research. The reviewers, however pos-
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itive their evaluations, do not attest to the accuracy of the study; their
assignment is simply to evaluate the appropriateness of the methodology,
the completeness of the reporting, and the importance and novelty of
the topic.
(2) Studies that are rejected for publication by peer review are not
necessarily wrong or misleading. In fact, there are famous examples of
articles that were turned down at first and went on the become classics in
their fields, ( and famous examples of published peer-reviewed nonsense).
(3) Peer review is a slow process that is designed for substantial works
of originaJ research. Most scientific testimony in court cases consists
of specific applications of established principles. Such work is usually
unsuitable for publication because it has little or no general scientific
interest, and publication is often impractical because it must be completed
and presented quickly to meet the timetable of litigation.
(4) Courts could not successfully apply a standard based on an editorial process with which they are so thoroughly unfamiliar. Worse,
making peer review an issue in legal proceedings would have predictable
and unfortunate effects on the operation of scientific journals. Judge
Kozinski's opinion contains no definition of a "peer-reviewed journal."
The world of science already includes a large and varied collection of
publications that fit that description, ranging from those at the top that
are extremely selective (e.g., The New England Journal of Medicine) , to
some at the bottom that are not so choosy. A peer review-based Frye
test would create an incentive to send any research that might be the
subject of testimony straight to the bottom, in order to avoid the danger
of rejection. Worse, it might spark the creation of ersatz "peer reviewed
journals." If they printed their purpose on the masthead - The Annals of
Impending Testimony or the Journal of Unpublishable Results - they might
be spotted. But more realistic ventures, with respectable shells and mixed
purposes, would get by.

8. The Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court used Daubert as a vehicle to review the viability of
the Frye test, and to reject it.39 Given that decision, it was unnecessary
to consider the peculiar additions embroidered on to Frye by Judge
Kozinski- extending Frye from scientific techniques to the conclusions
of expert witnesses, and (apparently) equating "general acceptance" with
peer review. 40
Frye was widely followed by American courts, but never universally
endorsed. For decades, it was the dominant authority on the admissibility
of scientific evidence,41 but by 1992 its heyday had passed. It was the
rule in seven federal circuits,42 four circuits had rejected it, 43 and the
First Circuit- along with the Supreme Court- had not spoken on the
issue. 44 Many state courts followed Frye, but some did not. 45 AJmost
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all cases applying Frye were criminal prosecutions;46 Daubert was only
the third federa l civil case to use this rule. 47 In the two decades before
Daubert, Frye had been widely attacked as outmoded, unmanageable,
and unduly restrictive. 48 Critics argued that the "general acceptance" test
required judges to make decisions they were not competent to make,
imposed an excessively high burden on the proponents of novel scientific
evidence, excluded valuable information at the frontiers of knowledge,
and produced arbitrary results depending on how a court defined the
"field" in which the evidence had to attain acceptance. Moreover, since
the adoption of the federal rules of evidence in 1975, the legal status of
Frye (in federal courts at least) had been under a cloud. The petitioners
in Daubert, and many evidence scholars before them, argued that Frye
had been repealed by Rule 702. The Supreme Court agreed- correctly,
I believe -and reversed.
The question turns on Federal Rule of Evidence 402, which states:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otbeiwise provided
by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by
these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not re levant is
inadmissible.

In othe r words, Rule 402 abolishes common law objections to evidence.
Since Frye's "general acceptance" test is not mentioned anywhere in the
Federal Rules that govern expert evidence, Frye could only survive if it
is a reasonable and useful interpretation of the relevant portion of Rule
702: "If scientific knowledge will assist the trier of fact ... a witness
qualified as an expert .. . may testify thereto .... "
Nothing about Rule 702 itself suggests that the unstated qualification
"generally accepted" should be read into it. The best argument that
could be made is that "general acceptance" is an implied quality of
"scientific knowledge." This would have been a strained reading, unless the Court were willing to derive the insertion from the historical
context: Frye was widely applied in 1975, and since the drafters of the
Federal Rules of Evidence did not explicitly reject it, they must have
endorsed it. In fact, the context suggests the opposite, since (as the
Court noted in Daubert) it was the clear intention of the drafters to
liberalize the use of expert testimony. 49 But the strongest arguments
against Frye are not historical or textual but practical. A majority o n
the Court undoubtedly believes that federal courts have the authority to devise judge-made rules to fill in gaps, resolve ambiguities, and
he lp provide consistency in the application of Federal Rules generally. They certainly do it themselves. But why this rule? Jt's arbitrary,
it was not much good to begin with, by now its problems are famo us, and Daubert presented a clear occasion to reconsider and reject
it.
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Having rejected Frye's "general acceptance" test for scientific testimony,
the Supreme Court proceeded to devise one of its own. Under Rule 702,
the trial judge must decide two preliminary issues50 in order to admit
any scientific evidence:51 "whether the expert is proposing to testify to
(1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand
or determine a fact in issue."52 Or, to phrase it differently, judges must
decide "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony
is scientifically valid and whether that reasoning or methodology can be
properly applied to the facts at issue."53
The Court recognizes that this is a "flexible" inquiry,54 and that "many
factors will bear on it."55 It then goes on to Jist four that are likely
to become the focus of future litigation: (1) Is the theory or technique
testable, and has it been tested? If not, it probably does not qualify as
science.56 (2) Has the theory or technique "been subjected to peer review
and publication"?57 This ought to be "a relevant though not dispositive
consideration in assessing the scientific validity" of the evidence.58 (3) If
the evidence concerns a particular scientific technique, what is its " known
or potential rate of error"?59 ( 4) Finally, "general" or "widespread"
acceptance, while not a requirement, "can be an important factor in
ruling particular evidence admissible.... "60

C. Did Frye Matter?
So Frye has been rejected; so what? At first blush, I'm tempted to say "Not
much" - and that may prove to be so. Frye bad two aspects. It embodied
a recognition that courts must (in some manner) screen purportedly
scientific evidence that is presented to them. That is an enduring and
uncontroversial precedent. But Frye also announced a specific test for
admissibility, the test that was rejected in Daubert. As a specific test,
Frye may never have mattered nearly as much as all the fuss suggests.
As I've mentioned, several states never adopted Frye, and others
explicitly rejected it within the past ten years. 61 Has practice in these states
differed markedly from that in states that follow Frye? Not in any major
way. For example, most states continue to exclude polygraph evidence - at
least in the absence of a stipulation by the parties- regardless of whether
they follow Frye.62 Among the few state decisions admitting polygraph
evidence without a stipulation, the two earliest were in New Mexico,63
which followed Frye,64 and Ohio,65 which did not follow Frye and later
explicitly rejected it.66 Similarly, most federal court cases on polygraph
evidence continued to exclude it, in Frye and non-Frye circuits alike,
but some recent cases in both types of jurisdiction say that trial judges
have discretion to admit polygraph evidence, at least at the request of
a criminal defendant.67 Or consider voiceprint identification evidence,
which was in vogue in the 1960s and 70s,68 but fell into disrepute after
a committee appointed by the National Academy of Science found that
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the technique had no scientific basis.69 In that case the admissibility of
the evidence did bear some relationship to the test appUed, since the
admissibility of voice print evidence was the context in which a few courts
rejected Frye. 70 Even so, admissibility could not be predicted from the
local status of Frye, especially not among the more recent cases.71 Finally,
on the most hotly debated scientific evidence issue of the decade the admissibility of DNA identification evidence- the courts are nearly
unanimous in letting it in, regardless of the test they use. 72
Daubert is not the first federal case that both rejects Frye and directs
judges to screen scientific evidence by reference to a set of several
factors. Eight years earUer, in United States v. Downing, 73 the Third
Circuit produced its own alternative to the "general acceptance" test: a
list of eight factors, several of which overlap with those later listed by
the Supreme Court.74 And yet, there is no particular reason to believe
that practice in the Third Circuit with regard to scientific evidence has
diverged from that in other circuits; Bendectin claims, for instance, have
fared about as poorly there as elsewhere. 75
It should not be much of a surprise that the formal test for admission
of scientific evidence seems to make little difference. For one thing, the
two types of tests are more similar than they may seem. Daubert and
Downing both include "general acceptance" as a factor to be considered
among others, and while Frye says that "general acceptance" is the
only criterion, there is rarely direct evidence on this point, so judges
must look for circumstantial indicia of "general acceptance" - including,
conspicuously, reliability. As the Sixth Circuit put it:
[W]e deem, general acceptance as being nearly synonymous with
reliability. If a scientific process is reliable, or sufficiently accurate,
courts may also deem it "generally accepted."76
More important, Downing and Daubert promise more than they can
deliver. They avoid some of the arbitrary consequences (read: arbitrary
exclusions) that may follow from mindless reliance on "general acceptance," if judges are knowledgeable and make good use of their new
freedom in conducting the "flexible inquiries" that are now required - a
significant if. Frye was criticized because the "general acceptance" of a
principle o r technique is a scientific issue that courts are not competent to evaluate. Daubert and Downing require them to make that same
evaluation and a good deal more.
In most cases, of course, judges don't do any of this. They decide
whether to admit scientific evidence not by determining global facts (is
the polygraph a "generally accepted" test for deception?), nor by weighing
facto rs pro and con (Testability? -yes; tested - yes; peer review - no; and
so forth), but by referring to specific governing precedents: has DNA
identification been admitted in this state? Has that decision been affirmed
by the State Supreme Court? Ultimately, it seems, the major precedential
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decisions on which trial courts rely tend to converge on the same results,
regardless of the test used.
Nonetheless, Daubert may have substantial impact after all. On its
face, the Supreme Court's decision loosens the standard for admitting
scientific evidence by overruling the restrictive test announced by the
District of Columbia Circuit seventy years earlier. In theory, such a ruling
could produce a sharp increase in the quantity of questionable scientific
evidence that is admitted in federal courts. In practice, not only is such a
shift unlikely, but the decision is more likely to cause a modest shift in the
opposite direction. The Daubert opinion recognizes - no, celebrates - the
role of the trial judge as a gatekeeper who screens scientific evidence
on its way to the jury. The discretionary power of the trial court judge
is broadcast at every turn. The Court removes any ambiguity that the
decision is for the judge, not the jury.77 It lists multiple statutory bases
for decisions to exclude- Rule 702, Rule 703, and Rule 403, the catch-all
provision that gives judges discretion to exclude relevant evidence if it is
unduly confusing, wasteful or prejudicial.78 The Court allows judges to
base their decisions on a wide range of factors rather than on a single
and apparently specific test,79 and it explicitly recognizes and accepts the
costs of giving them this power:
We recognize that in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no
matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from
learning of authentic insights and innovations. That, nevertheless, is
the balance that is struck. ...80
Paradoxically, the main effect of Daubert may be to embolden some
judges to exclude more purportedly scientific evidence than they would
have under the "inflexible" and "austere" Frye test81 that Daubert rejects
as unduly restrictive.82

Ill. What's Really at Stake?
As we have seen, the real claim in Daubert was not that the data or
the method of the plaintiffs' experts were unacceptable, but that the
conclusion they reached was false. This concern surfaces time and again
in the lower court opinions in Daubert, in the Supreme Court briefs
submitted by Merrell and its amici, and in other Bendectin cases. The
First Circuit's opinion in Lynch v. M errell-National Laboratories Division
of Richardson-Merrell is a good illustration.83 After brief review of the
studies, the court concludes:
[O]n the basis of the epidemiological evidence to date, Bendectin
is as likely as aspirin to cause limb reduction [birth defects].... The
association of Bendectin with limb reduction is in the opinion of the
health-care community an instance of popular delusion and error. ...
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A new study coming to a different conclusion and challenging the
consensus would be admissible in evidence. Without such a study
there is nothing on which expert opinion on Bendectin as a cause
[of birth defects] may be based.84

In Richardson v. Richardson-Me"ell Inc.,8.5 the District of Columbia
Circuit followed Lynch. In the process it had to distinguish an earlier
toxic tort case, Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical,86 in which it had affirmed a
judgment based on evidence no stronger than that offered by the plaintiff
in Richardson. The issue in Ferebee was whether exposure to the herbicide
paraquat can cause pulmonary fibrosis. The evidence in support consisted
of the opinions of two of the deceased plaintiff's treating physicians, who
testified that they believed that bad happened in this case. Apparently,
no systematic studies of any sort were introduced, and even one of
the plaintiff's experts concluded "that cases like Ferebee's were rare."87
Chevron argued that this was not enough, but the court disagreed: "The
short answer to Chevron's argument is that two expert witnesses refuted
it and the jury was entitled to believe those experts. " 88
In Richardson, however, the D.C. Circuit explains that paraquat is one
thing and Bendectin something else entirely. The relationship between
paraquat and lung disease was untested, it stood "at the frontier of
current medical and epidemiological inquiry. "89 With Bendectin, howeve r,
we are at the other end of the spectrum . . . . And far from a
paucity of scientific information on the oft-asserted claim of causal
relationship of Bendectin and birth defects, the drug has been
extensively studied and a wealth of published epidemiological data
has been amassed, none of which has concluded that the drug is
teratogenic.90
Any ambiguity about the meaning of Richardson was removed in Ealy
v. Richardson-Me"el~ Inc., 91 a later District of Columbia Circuit case
following it:
[A]n expert opinion that Bendectin is a human teratogen which
caused the plaintiff's birth defects is without scientifi c foundation
under Federal Rule of Evidence 703 in the face of "a wealth of
published epidemiological data" to the contrary. . .. Accordingly
such expert opinion is inadmissible.92
The underlying rule that emerges is simple: "expert opinion evidence
that Bendectin causes birth defects is inadmissible because it is wrong."
It's also an oxymoron. This cannot be a test for admissibility. A court
could hardly apply such a test and then require the jury to answer the
question: "Does Bendectin cause birth defects?" A court that employs
this test is obviously using "admissibility" as a disguise to determine the
merits of the claim; it has already decided that Bendectin does not cause
birth defects. In Daubert itself, the Supreme Court (without citing Lynch
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or Richardson) disapproves this sort of evaluation: "The focus [of the
judge's inquiry], of course, must be solely on principles and methodology,
not on the conclusions they generate. " 93
Why use such an internally inconsistent rule? The impulse to find
for the defendant in Bendectin cases is perfectly understandable: the
evidence is overwhelmingly in its favor. What's more, since Merrell keeps
facing the same evidence in case after case and winning (at trial or
on appeal), it's also understandable that judges would want to shortcircuit the process and rule for the defendant as a matter of law. But
why not do it the obvious way-why not simply rule (on a motion
for judgment as a matter of law) that the evidence against Bendectin,
while admissible, is insufficient to create a genuine factual dispute? lwo
federal circuits have done just that: the Fifth Circuit in Brock v. Me"ell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,94 and the Sixth Circuit in Turpin v. Me"ell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 95 both on records similar to that in Daubert.
But three other circuits- the First in Lynch, the District of Columbia
in Richardson and Ealy, and the Ninth in Daubert itself- all relied on
admissibility rather than sufficiency to achieve the same result.
A scientific question is never presented to the courts in the abstract. It
comes up in the context of a particular dispute between specific parties
that must end with a binding final judgment. In the process, all factual
issues must somehow be resolved, even if essential questions cannot
be answered with confidence. This is true for specific historical facts
(Was the light red or green? Did the defendant see something that
looked like a knife before he shot the deceased?) as least as often as
it is for general scientific issues (Does Bendectin cause birth defects in
human fetuses? Does non-ionizing radiation from electrical power lines
and substations cause cancer?). But there are two differences. (1) The
exact same scientific question can come up repeatedly, in dozens or
in thousands of cases; similar patterns are rare for ordinary historical
issues, and when they do occur (e.g., common factual issues in airline
crash cases), the number of trials involved is likely to be comparatively
smaH. (2) There is a well developed and highly successful method for
investigating such questions- the scientific method - that it is at odds with
the requirements of legal fact finding. Scientists are interested in truth,
which is elusive; therefore they try to be comfortable with uncertainty.
They work with hypotheses and theories that can be disproven but not
directly proven. The most interesting and innovative scientific thinking is
usualJy provisional, and even established scientific findings - in principle,
all scientific findings- are subject to revision. Courts are happy to find
truth, if they can, but (truth or no truth) they are required to decide
cases by judgments that cannot normally be revised if better information
becomes available.
All legal systems need some method or another for reaching final
judgments on uncertain facts. In our system the archetypal procedure for
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doing so is trial by jury. In fact many legal disputes-probably mostare tried by judges without juries,!16 and some of those include tricky
scientific questions. But the prominent cases with problematic scientific
evidence seem to occur in categories that are generally tried by juries:
criminal prosecutions and personal injury suits of one sort or another.
As a result this issue has been framed in terms of fact finding by juries.
A jury is a one-time, ad-hoc, non-professional decision-making group.
Juries are probably more unpredictable than other fact finders because
each jury is constituted for one case only. A jury has no colJective
experience of its own to learn from, no track record for litigants to
rely on, and almost no opportunity to learn from the experience of
other juries. Juries are also delphic. They are never asked to justify
or explain their decisions, or to describe the evidence on which they
relied. A typical jury verdict consists of very few words - the name of
the winning side, and (if it's the plaintiff in a civil case) the amount
of the judgment. In unusual cases, civil juries are sometimes asked to
answer one or several factual interrogatories; for example, the jury in the
consolidated Bendectin trial answered "no" to the question: "Have the
plaintiffs established by a preponderance of the evidence that ingestion of
Bendectin at therapeutic doses during the period of fetal organogenesis
is the proximate cause of human birth defects?" 97 But even this unusual
procedure makes the jury's judgment only slightly less opaque.
Finally, and most important, jury decisions are substantively unreviewable. This is an overstatement, but only a slight one. Judges do
occasionally grant motions for new trial or for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, but these are limited restraints. They are infrequently exercised, and they require the judge to decide that the jury's final verdict is
unreasonable or inconsistent with the evidence. There is no procedure
for a court to review the quality of a jury's reasoning or the accuracy of the factual premises on which it relied, since these intermediate
steps are neither recorded nor expressed, and the jurors themselves are
not allowed to "impeach their verdict" by telling the court how it was
reached. 98 Indeed, it is hard to avoid the impression that on the whole
judges not only accept the fact that jury verdicts are impenetrable, they
relish it. Faced with what looks like an unanswerable question - does
paraquat cause pulmonary fibrosis? - they seem happy to say: "Given
the conflicting evidence, the jury was entitled to find .... " Or, to put
it unkindly: "Following a proper ceremony, the question was put to the
oracle. . . . " This argument sells. It's not exactly a religion, but the
jury may be the most popular and trusted institution we use to exercise
governmental authority.
Judges, of course, are not mindless jury fans. Quite the contrary. They
worry that juries are too readily confused, too easily swayed by passions,
too willing to ignore fixed rules of law out of sympathy or anger. Much
of the elaborate common law of evidence is based on this systemic
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mistrust of juries. Some judges also complain that juries are unsuitable
for "complex" cases, especially those that depend on expert and technical
evidence99 -although it's not at all obvious that judges themselves handle
such cases better. Finally, juries cost a lot. It is expensive, in both cash
and opportunity costs, to run trials in the dramatic, over-prepared, door-die, one-time continuous performance mode that is required by this
awkward fact finder.
These are general characteristics of juries. There is also a particular
problem that looms large in the context of Bendectin and other toxic
tort cases: Juries tend to be inconsistent in the sense that different juries
reach different judgments on the identical issue. This has been shown
repeatedly by experimental studies of juries100 - but it is also necessarily
true of jurors and of individual decision makers, including judges. Indeed,
jury research shows that the collective process of deliberation reduces
interpersonal variation in judgment. 101 If each case presented a new
issue, juries might have no disadvantage in this respect over judges or
any other type of tribunal, or they might be better. But when the same
issue is tried repeatedly jury decision making suffers by comparison not
because juries are stupid but because they are ephemeral. The jurors in
a Bendectin case are unlikely to be influenced by the decisions of other
juries dealing with the identical issue for the simple reason that they
won't know about them. The judgments of other juries are inadmissible
as evidence that what those juries found is true-that would be hearsay
and inadmissible opinion evidence- and (in the usual case) there will
be no other jury issue on which those judgements are relevant. Equally
important, jurors will typically have no information about other similar
cases through informal channels.
A judge, however, will know. Many of the earlier decisions (or appeals
from them) are published in case reports. The judge may have seen
them on her own, heard about them from colleagues, or even read about
them in a law review article; if not they will be brought to her attention
in motions to dismiss o r for summary judgment, or informally in pretrial discussions of motions, dates, and possible settlements. Trial judges,
therefore, are able to make their findings consistent from case to case,
if they want to. If they don't want to, consistency can be more easily
achieved on review. Appellate judges may be more willing to reverse
the verdict of other judges than those of juries, and they certainly have
more to work with, since judges must justify their decisions with written
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
In the Bendectin cases, most juries came to the correct conclusion,
assuming (as I do throughout) that Bendectin is not in fact a teratogen.
Of 22 jury trials that produced verdicts, the defendant won 14, for an
overall success rate of 64%. (There were also 2 hung juries and o ne
mistrial.) 102 But that also means that juries were wrong in 36% of the
cases, and wrong in the face of overwhelming scientific evidence for the
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defense. It is tempting to conclude that judges would have done better,
but it's not obvious that they are any more skillful than juries at evaluating
evidence of this sort. For example, Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Co. 103
was another product liability law suit in which the plaintiff claimed that
her birth defects were caused by a product that her mother used during
the plaintiff's gestation. The product in Wells was orthogynol spermicidal
jelly, a popular contraceptive that is widely used in the United States
in conjunction with diaphragms. As with Bendectin, the epidemiological
evidence in Wells was strong and one-sided: several studies bad shown
that orthogynol spermicidal jelly is not a teratogen. 104 Wells was tried
without a jury, and despite this evidence the judge awarded the plaintiff
a judgment of $5.1 million.105 Wells was the first orthogynol trial. (In the
only other case of which I am aware, the defe ndant won a motion for
summary judgment. 106) If the Bendectin litigation had consisted of 25
first trials, the outcomes may have been roughly the same whether tried
by judges or by juries.
There was, of course, only one first trial, which was retried, followed
by a second, followed by the consolidated trial in the Southern District
of Ohio, and so forth. By the e nd of 1985 the defendant had won 3 of
the 4 cases that had been completed, including the consolidated trial. At
that point the emerging pattern could have become a de facto trial-court
rule, if juries had no role in the remaining cases. In any new Bendectin
case, everybody- including the trier of fact-would know in advance that
Merrell had already won repeatedly on the same issue and the same
evidence. To rule against Merrell would seem both unfair and inefficient,
and (since appellate courts could be expected to feel the same way)
would court reversal. As it happened Merrell won both of the Bendectin
bench trials that went to verdict after 1986 (the only bench trials in the
entire set), but only 11 of the 17 jury trials. 107
(Merrell's attorneys did make this point, as best they could. For
example, in DeLuca v. Me"ell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 108 the Third Circuit
comments that the defendant's "apparent litigation strategy .. . was to
emphasize that 'in all material respects, the instant case is identical to
the cases where su mmary judgment has been granted in Merre ll Dow's
favor.' " 109 This was no doubt an excellent plan even, as in DeLuca, in
the context of a motion for summary judgment; it wou ld have succeeded
more readily if the argument could have been addressed to a judge with
plenary power to weigh the evidence.)
The only way to achieve consistency in a set of cases of this sort is
to take them away from juries. The most effective method is to bar
the underlying claim, procedurally (by a statute of limitations, by some
form of immunity, or whatever) or substantively (by holding that there is
no cause of action for these injuries against this defendant) - if there is
some legal basis for doing so. In the case of Benedectin, there appears
to have been none. If that's not possible, the courts will be forced to
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dismiss any suits that are filed on one of the two available evidentiary
grounds: by holding that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law, or
by holding that it is inadmissible. As the Bendectin cases illustrate, courts
do not like to admit evidence and say it's insufficient. Instead, they wilJ
go to unfortunate lengths to find that essential parts are inadmissable,
and then say that there's not enough left to go to the jury.
The basic problem seems to be that judges do not want to look as
though they are abrogating the role of the jury as trier of fact. The legal
sufficiency of evidence is, technically, a question of law, but it looks and
sounds like a judgment on the weight of the evidence - it is a judgment
on the weight of the evidence, only an extreme one. This is particularly
true for expert evidence, since traditionally courts have held that the
testimony of any qualified expert is sufficient to sustain a verdict on any
issue on which she testified.
Expert testimony is admitted in evidence as an exception to the usual
rules limiting opinion evidence and restricting witnesses to facts within
their personal knowledge. In effect, such evidence is an exception to
a basic division of functions in common-law trials: witnesses present
information, jurors evaluate it. Expert witnesses evaluate facts as well as
present them; indeed, that is often their main function. 11 Frequently they
testify to evaluations - expert conclusions- that are identical to those
the jury must make, 111 and yet we consider this evidence. It is hard to
say that the testimony of a witness who speaks in such terms - "the
plaintiff is diabetic" or "Bendectin causes birth defects" - is admissible
but insufficient to support a finding of fact that simply restates the
testimony. That would amount to saying: "The jurors may hear and
consider this witness-in fact they are required to do so - but they are
also required to disbelieve her."
Evidence is often said to be either circumstantial or direct. CircumstantiaJ evidence of a fact at issue is evidence which (if believed) supports
an inference that the fact exists. Testimony that there were bootprints in
the snow (to choose a traditional cliche) is circumstantial evidence that
a person has walked by, since the conclusion depends on the (extremely
plausible) inference that the prints were made by a walking person.
Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, directly proves the fact
at issue, with no intervening inference - for example, testimony from
a witness who claims to have seen a person crossing the snowy field.
McCormick explains how the issue of sufficiency differs in the context of
these two types of evidence: "Generally no difficulty occurs where the
evidence is direct. Except in rare cases, it is sufficient, though given by
one witness only, however negligible a human being she may be. But
if the evidence is circumstantial, forensic disputes often arise as to its
sufficiency.... " 112
Strictly speaking, expert opinion testimony is neither direct nor circumstantial evidence in the usual sense of these terms. It is a judgment
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about facts that the expert has considered. However, an expert opinion
on causation in a Bendectin case sounds very much like direct evidence:
the opinion, if believed, resolves the issue at stake with no additional
steps. As a consequence, the testimony of a single expert-"however
negligible" -is often given the same dignity (for the purpose of rulings
on the sufficiency of evidence) as the testimony of a lone eyewitness. A
case from the California court of appeals illustrates this link:
The testimony of a medical witness in answer to hypothetical
questions based on the facts in the record is sufficient to support
a finding contrary to the testimony of other medical experts who
have seen and examined the patient. The testimony of one credible
witness, if believed, is sufficient to support a finding of the court. 113
In the context of toxic tort litigation, this classic position was restated
by the District of Columbia Circuit in Ferebee:
(I]f experts are willing to testify that such a link exists [between
long term exposure to paraquat and pulmonary fibrosis} it is for the
jury to decide whether to credit their testimony. u 4
But, of course, if the court finds the expert evidence inadmissible, the
jury never faces this task. 115
In short, the nature of expert testimony invites substantive judicial
review. Since expert witnesses are allowed to pronounce judgment on the
central issues in dispute- a prerogative we otherwise reserve to juries
and judges - it is natural that the courts sometimes intervene to evaluate
the quality of their evidence. Our rules of practice, however, drive judges
who do so to pretend that they are acting on a question of procedure,
namely, admissibility.
Unfortunately attempts to use admissibility to achieve consistency in
toxic tort litigation do not work, at least not if the attempt resembles
anything like a true rule of evidence. On the one hand, a court can get
specific and say, as the District of Columbia Circuit has said, that "an
expert opinion that Bendectin is a human teratogen ... is inadmissible." 116
But it is unprincipled to pretend that this is really an evidentiary ruling.
Rulings on objections to evidence are supposed to be made on the basis
of categorical criteria- testimony is hearsay because it repeats an outof-court statement and is offered to prove the truth of that statement; a
document is not privileged because it was not written as a communication
to an attorney; and so forth. To be sure, many evidentiary rulings require
the court to consider the item in question in the context of other evidence.
(This is particularly true for objections that evidence is irrelevant in the
absence of other evidence of a necessary precondition, 117 or that the
probative value of evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of
confusion and prejudice. 118 ) But it takes judicial chutzpah to decide the

254

SAMUEL

R.

GROSS

central factual issue of a case, grant summary judgment, and call it a
ruling on admissibility.
A court could try to achieve the same result by devising a genuine
rule of exclusion. But the tool does not fit the task. Admissibility, like
liability, is an either/or proposition. Not surprisingly, courts that do this
try to define evidentiary requirements that have the same dichotomous
quality: general acceptance, statistical significance, peer review. At first
blush, this seems appropriate: a technique or a finding either is or is
not generally accepted, or statisticalJy significant, or whatever, so a court
can easily say whether it is or is not admissible. In practice, these rules
break down, one after the other.
The worst problem with such rules is the misuse of scientific concepts.
Scientists do not use general acceptance or peer review as preconditions
for considering information, and most no longer use statistical significance
for that purpose, if they ever did. Peer review119 and tests of s tatistical
significance120 were designed for other purposes, and general acceptance
is not a scientific criterion for anything. Sometimes the most informative
findings on an issue wilJ be not statistically significant (perhaps because
of a limited number of observations), or not published, or not gene rally
recognized.
In addition, the major virtue of these rules turns out to be illusory: In
practice, they are not easy to apply after all. Statistical significance looks
like a readily determinable attribute, but in fact it can become quite
tricky. For example, in many situations an expert (or a lawyer) can select
(or manipulate) the data that are subjected to this statistical test - as the
use of meta analysis in the Bendectin cases illustrates. Peer review looks
like a straightforward issue - did it take place or didn't it? - but that
may be true only so long as peer review does not have determinative
forensic significance. If peer review became a general requirement for
admissibility, it would also become distorted and problematic, and courts
might be forced to settle disputes over whose peers and which journals
are good enough to count. And general acceptance, of course, is a
notoriously slippery concept, even as applied to theories and techniques.
You can't see it; you have to infer it from whatever evidence you can
gather about the field assu ming that the field is somehow well defined.
An attempt to determine the general acceptance of a particular scientific
conclusion quickly becomes an inquiry into its truth-which, again, cannot
be a method of determining the admissibility of evidence of the truth of
that very same conclusion.
Finally, creating a rule of admissibility in order to resolve a substantive
problem breeds new problems in future cases. It may satisfy the needs
of the moment to say that the expert's opinion is inadmissible because
there is no epidemiological research, no statistically significant finding,
or no peer reviewed study. But will this test work in the next case up?
Should we have to go through a plenary trial io a Bendectin case (or
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five of them) just because a plaintiff produces evidence of a statistically significant finding in a single epidemiological study of uncertain
quality that was published in a "peer reviewed" journal of extremely
modest distinction? Should we dismiss outright a case like Ferebee, or a
stronger case, in which the available evidence consistently suggests that
the substance in question did cause the plaintiff's pathology, because no
epidemiological studies have yet been completed?

IV. What to Do?

A. Easy Cases
Daubert was an easy case in more senses than one. Not only was the
legal issue before the Court a clear call, but so was the underlying factual
dispute as well. By 1993 just about everybody agreed that Bendectin is
not a human teratogen, or at least that there is no substantial evidence
that it is. This consensus is reflected in the decisions of most juries that
tried Bendectin cases, and in the actions (if not always words) of almost
all judges who presided over and reviewed those trials. The final problem
was, and is, merely procedural: bow to dispose of the remaining cases
efficiently and consistently.
The simple straightforward way to do so would be to redefine the
question of causation - does Bendectin cause birth defects? - as one of
"law" (to be decided by the judge) rather "fact" ( to be decided by
the jury). At first blush, this sounds like cheating. How can this be
anything other than a question of fact? But courts constantly resolve
factual questions in the process of deciding "legal" issues, from ''was the
statement made under a belief in impending death?"121 to "is this the
sort of evidence on which experts in the field reasonably rely in reaching
conclusions on such matters?"122 The issue is whether this factual question
is for juries to decide or for judges; the category in which it is placed,
"factual" or "legal," is simply a label we attach to that assignment. In
this case, there is a strong argument that it should be given to judges.
To be sure, the question of causation in a tort case is one we normally submit to juries. But not always. A plaintiff who claimed that the
defendant caused his ulcer by witchcraft would not get far, nor would
a defendant who admitted exposing the plaintiff to staphylococcus but
de nied that bacteria cause illness. Either case would present a traditional context for judicial notice that the claims are wrong, since contrary
propositions are widely regarded as indisputable. Unfortunately, the case
for Bendectio is less clearcut. Even given the lopsided pattern of epidemiological findings, the claim that Bendectin is a human teratogeo is
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hardly "indisputably" faJse- although one could argue that it is indisputable that the available evidence is inadequate to prove that claim by
any standard.
In other contexts, courts frequently make similar factual decisions
without requiring anything like indisputability. When a court decides
that five-member juries function less well than six-member juries,123
or (applying Daubert) that DNA profiling is a reliable technique for
determining the identity of a suspect in a criminal case,124 it is making a
factual determination on a debatable question as a step in the process of
announcing a "rule of law." In 1942, Professor Kenneth C. Davis named
this age-old process "legislative fact finding," 125 and the name has stuck.
Legislative fact finding is often described as a species of judicial notice,126
which makes some sense, since under both procedures the court makes
factual decisions and is not restricted to the record in doing so. But, as
Professor Davis wrote, the role of the common law judge requires more
latitude than the traditional restrictions on judicial notice permit:
[J]udge made law would stop growing if judges, in thinking about
questions of law and policy, were forbidden to take into account the
facts they believe, as distinguished from facts that which are "clearly
... within the domain of the indisputable. " 127
Judging from published opinions, legislative fact finding must be something like sex: judges do it all the time, but rarely taJk about it in public.
Most if not all decisions that announce significant innovations in legal
doctrine include factual premises that are open to dispute, and typically
these premises rest at least in part on extra-judicial information. But
very few opinions actually mention this embarrassing activity by name,
and those that do generally keep the references to the margins- in a
footnote, 128 in a concurring or a dissenting opinion, 129 describing what
some other court has done in some other case.130 The reason, I suppose,
is that the name smacks of judicial legislation, which is a political taboo.
In any event, this shyness makes it possible to overlook the fact that the
practice (like sex) is essential, widespread, and accepted.
The real issue is not whether legislative fact-finding by courts is legitimate, but when and where. That question requires a comparison with
the competing procedure, adjudicative fact finding on the records by the
trier of fact:
When a court or agency finds facts concerning the immediate
parties-who did what, where, when, how, and with what motive or
intent - the court or agency is performing an adjudicative function,
and the facts are conveniently called adjudicative facts. . ..
Stated in other terms, adjudicative facts are those to which the
law applies in the process of adjudication. They are the facts that
normally go to the jury in the process of adjudication. They relate
to the parties, their activities, their properties, their businesses. 131

SUBSTANCE AND FORM IN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

257

By contrast:
Legislative facts are those which help the tribunal to determine
the content of a law and policy and to exercise its discretion in
determining what course of action to take. Legislative facts are
ordinarily general and do not concern the immediate parties. 132
Many issues can be neatly classified by this dichotomy. How fast was
the bus going? - Adjudicative. Are buses subject to the speed limit for
automobiles or that for trucks? - Legislative. Did the defendant know
that it was wrong to kill the deceased?-Adjudicative. What is the test
for legal insanity? - Legislative. Unfortunately, the main issue at stake
in the Bendectin cases - is this drug a teratogen? -falls between these
two stools. The factual issue is not one that concerns the immediate
parties - "who did what, where, when, how, and with what motive or
intent" - but it does look like the type of issue that normally goes to the
jury. Is it the sort of fact that helps judges "determine the content of
law"? Maybe, but that merely begs the question. The issue at stakecausation in a tort case- is one we ordinarily submit to juries; but that
doesn't mean that we are required to do so in this context.
Courts are not reluctant to base findings of legislative fact on scientific
evidence. For example, several courts have held that the results of a
blood-grouping test that purports to exclude paternity are conclusive. The
only issues left for the jury are whether the test was properly conducted,
and whether that was the finding:
There should be no occasion for expert testimony in every case to
prove the scientific validity of blood-grouping tests resulting in exclusion of paternity. The scientific opinion on that point is so general
that courts may take judicial notice of it in filiation proceedings. 133
And, of course, courts are perfectly comfortable making legislative
findings of scientific fact when they decide that a scientific technique has
gained general acceptance or is sufficiently reliable to warrant admission
in evidence. For example, in United States v. Jakobetz, 134 after a detailed
discussion of the scientific bases and techniques of DNA profiling, the
Second Circuit held that "in future cases with a similar evidentiary issue,
a court could properly take judicial notice of the general acceptability
of the general theory and the use of these specific techniques." 135
The evidence on the issue of general causation in the Bendectin cases
is roughly the same type as the evidence in the DNA profiling or the
blood-group paternity cases. The conclusion the courts might reach,
however, is not so similar. In the cases on DNA profiling, the courts
have found that the technique is sufficiently reliable to be admissible.
This is a traditional, old-fashioned evidentiary ruling that opens the door
to a category of evidence. In the absence of other information, the
outcome of a particular case cannot be predicted from such a ruling; the
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DNA evidence could help prove a defendant's identity as the criminal,
or it could help prove bis innocence, or it could be indeterminant. The
decisions on blood tests in paternity cases are closer to a legislative
finding that Bendectin does not cause birth defects. The statement "a
drug cleared by 30 epidemiological studies did not cause the plaintiff's
birth defects" does sound quite a bit like the statement "a man cleared
by blood tests is not the father of the infant in this case." In fact, the
former statement is more sweeping. It is one thing to decide that a blood
test (or any other item of scientific evidence) has determinative weight
on an issue; the jury still has to find that this particular man was cleared
by a properly conducted test. It is another matter to conclude that the
universe of available evidence will not support a claim. To do that is to
abolish a cause of action in an entire set of cases, without regard to the
position of any individual party.
In an article on the use of science in the courts published nearly thirty
years ago, Professor Harold Korn wrote:
The effect of characterizing a determination as "legal" is to place
it within the court's sphere of influence and to acknowledge that
the determination bas the capacity for authoritative assimilation into
the legal system as transmissible doctrine. 136
Judges, according to Korn, engage in a "ceaseless search for consistency
and predictability in the legal order. "137 They achieve this consistency
by a form of forensic manifest destiny; to quote Thayer, a jury question
"is likely to be absorbed by the judge, 'whenever a rule about it can be
laid down.' " 138
The Bendectin cases cry out for absorption into transmissible legal
doctrine. And in fact, that has taken place. The unmistakable meaning
of the last decade of Bendectin litigation is this: No claim that Bendectin
caused a birth defect will be considered. This is a rule of law. The rule
could be changed in the unlikely event that some surprising new research
undermines the factual premises on which it is based, but that is not
unusual. What is slightly more unusual is that the courts are reluctant
to own up to what they have done.
The two Circuit Courts that held the evidence against Merrell insufficient as a matter of law were fairly explicit about what they were doing.
The normal standard for decision will not support their decisions - the
plaintiffs' expert evidence, considered in isolation, is legally sufficient
to go the a jury- but these are not normal cases. The essence of the
problem is the generality of the main issue. The Sixth Circuit:
The cases are variations on a theme, somewhat like an orchestra
which travels to different music halls, substituting musicians from
time to time but playing essentially the same repertoire. 139
The Fifth Circuit:
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[I]n mass torts the same issue is often presented over and over
to juries in different cases, and juries often split both ways on the
issue .... Appellate courts, if they take the lead in resolving those
questions ... can reduce some of the uncertainty which can tend
to produce a sub-optimal amount of new drug development. 140
Both Circuits were also careful to limit their rulings to Bendectin
cases. The basis for the decisions is the plaintiffs' failure to present
epidemiological evidence that Bendectin is a teratogen; however, "we do
not hold that epidemiological proof is a necessary element in all toxic
tort cases," 141 and "[w]e do not mean to intimate that animal studies lack
merit or power when it comes to predicting outcomes in humans."142 It
is only in the context of this record, with all the negative epidemiological
studies, that such a failure is fatal. These courts did not quite say "we
have weighed the evidence on both sides, and find as a matter of law
that Bendectin is not a teratogen," but they came close, 143 and their
meaning is clear.
Even this level of explicitness goes against the grain. Summary judgment
is only supposed to be granted when the losing party has failed to
present sufficient evidence to sustain a verdict, not when it has presented
substantial evidence but the opposition bas presented an overwhelming
rebuttal. 144 At least, that's the rule when summary judgment is ordered on
the "facts," because of insufficient evidence, rather than on the "law" and this one looks like a decision on the ''facts." So courts retreat to
the safer ground of ruling on admissibility.
There was a strong push in that direction in the Fifth Circuit. In Brock,
a suggestion for a rehearing en bane was rejected by a vote to 8 to
6, and the dissenters made clear that they were more concerned about
the rationale for the panel's opinion than the outcome: "It strikes me
that the issue in this case revolves around the admissibility of the expert
testimony .... the panel (however] chooses to accept the admissibj}jty
of the testimony and to quarrel with its effect." 145 Admissibility, of
course, was the basis for decision in the First, Ninth, and District of
Columbia Circuits, the other three federal appellate courts that have
explicitly closed the door on Bendectin suits. As far as this set of cases is
concerned, the effect is same. The route would be shorter, however, and
the law of torts and of evidence would be clearer, 146 if judges recognized
what they were doing and said it.

B. Hard Cases
Litigation favors hard cases. Truly easy issues are not likely to be disputed
at all, and if a disputed question becomes easy - e.g., Bendectin- the
courts tend to weed out the cases that depend on it, by one means
or another. They are replaced by a steady stream of new cases, raising
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questions that are not so easy-at least not yet. It's for these hard cases
that the evidentiary and substantive rules governing scientific evidence
matter most.
Hard cases are not all equally hard. Some depend on issues that
have been the subject of a great deal of scientific research -enough to
make legislative fact finding possible, even though the conclusion is not
foregone. A prime example is Judge Weinstein's famous opinion in In
re ':4.gent Orange" Product Liability Litigation. 147 The cases decided by
this opinion were claims by Vietnam veterans against various chemical
companies, alleging that they had been injured by exposure to dioxin, a
toxic contaminant of the herbicide ''Agent Orange" which had been manufactured by those companies and widely used in the Vietnam war. The
vast majority of the Agent Orange claims were included in a class-action
settlement, engineered by Judge Weinstein. 148 However , 281 plaintiffs
elected to opt out of this class action. These remaining "opt-out" cases
were dismissed by Judge Weinstein, who granted the defendants' motion
for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs bad presented
insufficient evidence that their injuries had been caused by exposure to
Agent Orange. 149 A lot has been written about Judge Weinstein's opinion
in the opt-out cases. 150 I will add very little to that body of writing- only
my own general conclusion that parts of the opinion are hard to defend,
but that Judge Weinstein's basic judgme nt was correct. The plaintiffs
could not prove that exposure to Agent Orange had harmed them, although the research was not as one-sided as the Bendectin studies. The
Agent Orange opt-out opinion encouraged other courts to take similar
action in other toxic tort cases, not least in the Bendectin cases. In Brock,
for example, the Fifth Circuit saw itself as following Judge Weinstein's
lead:
We are not without precedent in our approach to this problem.
The case before us parallel's in many respects the recently conducted
Agent Orange Litigatioo.151
A more recent toxic tort case, however, provides a better example of
a comparatively bard case in which legislative fact finding may still be
appropriate.
In In re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litigation (the
"Joint Asbestos" case),152 the central issue was whether a deceased sheet
metal worker's colon cancer bad been caused by workplace exposure
to asbestos. After a jury returned a $4,510,000 verdict against several
defe ndants, Judge Sweet of the Southern District of New York granted
the defendants' motion for j.n.o.v. on the ground that the plaintiff had
presented insufficient evidence of causation. Judge Sweet (who cites the
Agent Orange opt-out opinion and various Bendectin cases profusely)
appears to have excluded no scientific evidence at trial. Instead, he
claims to apply the usual standard for deciding a motion for a judgment
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as a matter of law: "[T)he sufficiency of the Plaintiff's epidemiological
evidence must be determined by analyzing that evidence on its face
and without weighing the evidence against it." 153 His published opinion
belies that claim. In a twelve-page discussion of the epidemiological
and clinical evidence, the judge goes back and forth from the plaintiff's
case, to the defendants' case, to the published literature, comparing and
criticizing. 154 A fair reading of the opinion leaves no doubt that his
conclusion- "the Plaintiff's epidemiological evidence fails to support the
claim that exposure to asbestos causes colon cancer" 155 - is based on a
detailed analysis of the entire record, on both sides.
The record on which Judge Sweet based his opinion is extensive. "During the course of the trial, approximately 45 epidemiological stud ies and
surveys of studies were discussed by the parties' experts. . .. " 156 Judging
from the opinion, most of these studies show no association between
asbestos and colon cancer, but a few do seem to show a comparatively
weak correlation. Given these studies, Judge Sweet's conclusion sounds
right: exposure to asbestos may increase the likelihood of developing
cancer of the colon, but the effect (if there is one) is too small to justify
a conclusion that any individual's cancer was more likely than not caused
by asbestos.
Exposure to asbestos is a common problem in the United States, and
colon cancer is a common cause of death. Inevitably, the possible causal
relationship between these two events has become a recurring issue
in litigation. 157 In that context- and given a sufficiently well developed
scie ntific basis - legislative fact finding is a sensible way to handle the
issue. That does not mean it's easy. Judge Sweet's opinion, like Judge
Weinstein's Agent Orange opt-out opinion, clearly reflects Jong study
and careful attention to abstruse technical issues. Most judges would
probably never try to reach reasoned scientific judgments in cases where
many studies find no causal relationship, but (unlike Bendectin) a few
see m to go the other way. And just as well. It should only be done with
great care. 158 Judge Sweet seem to have done well, but without a great
deal of expert knowledge, there's no sure way to tell. The real test, of
course, is time.159 In any event, if judges do write opinions like these it
wou ld be better if they would say what they mean. If it is appropriate
for the courts to make substantive scientific judgments on liability as a
matter of law, they should not muddy the waters by pretending merely
to apply procedural and evidentiary rules.

C. Harder Cases
The great majority of scientific issues that are presented in litigation are
not even remotely suitable for legislative fact finding. This is true, of
course, for legions of cases where the critical issue is the evaluation of
one person or a unique occurrence. It is also true of the issue of general
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causation in many toxic tort cases. Vann v. City of Woodhaven 160 - which
is described in detail by Professor Troyen A. Brennan161 - is a good
example. The plaintiffs in Vann were the parents of a 12 year old boy
who died of aplastic anemia; they claimed that the disease was caused
by exposure to a pesticide, Pratt 505K, which the defendant bad sprayed
to kill mosquitos. Various chemical companies that manufactured the
ingredients of Pratt 505K were joined as third-party defendants. Since
there were no epidemiological studies of Pratt 505K or its constituents, the
plaintiffs' experts relied on less telling evidence: case reports, structural
similarities between the chemicals involved and others that were known to
be toxic, in vitro studies and animal studies. The defense experts denied
that these were valid bases for reaching a conclusion on causation. 162
The jury, ultimately, found for the defense.
There was no evidentiary basis for excluding the plaintiffs' evidence
in Vann. It was, in fact "standard toxicological evidence." 163 At the same
time, there was no scientific basis for deciding whether or not Pratt
505K causes aplastic anemia: the available evidence was sufficient to
pose the question, but not to answer it. Worse yet (from a scientific
point of view) the problem is too uncommon to ever justify the time
and expense it would take to find out. Courts could resolve this type
of difficulty by requiring epidemiological evidence in every toxic tort
case. But that requirement would virtually foreclose an entire class of
cases-individual claims of uncommon types of injuries from exposure
to allegedly toxic substances. "There are over 100,000 synthetic chemical
used in the United States. Only a very small fraction have been subject
to epidemiological investigation." 164 Short of such a drastic step, the only
solution is to let the trier of fact- the jury- decide the merits of the
competing scientific claims.
In other words, there is no procedural short cut. In Vann, and in many
thousands of other law suits, courts must resolve scientific or technical
disputes, the significance of which is limited to the case at hand or to a
small set of related incidents. The issue may be the toxicity of a pesticide,
or the safety of a highway exit ramp, or the cause of an individual's brain
tumor, or the interpretation of fiber-match evidence. Ultimately such
questions are resolved by that notorious embarrassment of adversarial
fact finding, the battle of the experts.
Criticisms of this method are legion. They have been stated, forcefully,
for well over a hundred years. 165 I will not even attempt to summarize
them in this paper. For present purposes, Professor Brennan's comment
on the evidence in Vann will suffice:
Plaintiffs had every incentive to emphasize the importance of case
studies. Defense witnesses in turn had the same incentives to deny
the importance of animals studies and short-term tests. Thus, the
court never heard an even-handed account of toxicology. 166
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The common solution proposed for this problem is to call non-partisan
court-appointed experts to testify in addition to the parties' witnesses.167
I have written about this issue in detail elsewhere;168 I wilJ merely state
my main conclusions: Court appointment of expert witnesses is a widely
praised widely available procedure that is almost never used. The best
hope for improving our use of scientific evidence, and of expert evidence
in general, is to devise procedures that succeed in encouraging judges
to make wider use of this option.
Non-partisan experts might be as useful in cases in which courts engage in legislative fact finding as they would be in trials. The ultimate
judgment on Bendectin was clear, but it might have been reached more
easily and quickly if some judge along the line-or several judges-had
appointed a qualified epidemiologist to provide a non-partisan appraisal
of the evidence. Apparently that never happened. 169 In harder cases,
the value of non-partisan expertise is greater. While Judge Weinstein
may have done an excellent job in the Agent Orange opt-out case, his
method, as Professor Schuck has pointed out, was chancy. Despite all his
bard work, "he remained self-taught and incompletely informed, lacking
the intuition and finely honed technical judgment of the experienced
scie ntist." 170 Wouldn't his judgment have been safer if he had appointed
an experienced scientist to advise him? 171
The same applies to a determination of the "general acceptance" or
the "validity" of a scientific theory or technique as the basis for a ruling
on the admissibility under Frye or Daubert. Christopherson v. Allied Signal
Corp. 172 - yet another toxic tort case - is a good example. The plaintiff in
Christopherson claimed that her deceased husband contracted small-cell
colon cancer - a rare disease-as a result of work-place exposure to nickel
and cadmium. In the absence of epidemiological evioence, the plaintiff's
expert- Dr. Miller - based his conclusion on the following reasoning:
Nickel and cadmium are known to cause small-cell carcinomas in other
sites in the human body, especially the lungs. Small-cell carcinomas have
the same histology- that is, they appear to be made up of the same
cells- regardless of their location. Therefore, it is likely that these metals
also cause small-cell carcinomas in the colon, and-given the evidence
on exposure and on other possible causes - it is likely that they did so
in this individual.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment,
concluding, among other things:
Dr. Miller's conclusion that a small cell carcinoma of the lung is
likely to be associated with a small cell carcinoma located elsewhere
in the body is ''without precedent in cancer epidemiology and is not
scientifically correct. " 173
The Fifth Circuit, en bane, held that "[t]his finding of what is a scientifically correct conclusion is not for the district court." 174 Nonetheless,
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the court affirmed (over a bitter dissent175) on the ground that this impermissible judgment amounted to an implicit finding that Dr. Miller's
methodology failed Frye's general acceptance test. The same result could
just as easily have been reached under Daubert if the district court,
or the Fifth Circuit, had concluded that Dr. Miler's reasoning was not
scientifically valid.
Was the district court judge right? The only evidence before him were
affidavits from partisan experts; faced with a conflict he "simply chose
sides in this battle of the experts"176 and accepted the defendants' theory
of science. On what basis? Was it because there were several defense
experts but only one for the plaintiff? Or because the defense experts
had flashier credentials, or wrote better prose? Or was it because the
judge understood the scientific issues and accurately chose the correct
position?
As a matter of science, the judge in Christopherson may have made the
right choice, 177 but the process by which he reached his decision hardly
inspires confidence. Judges, no Jess than jurors, do get such questions
wrong. 178 If a judge is going to "usurp( ] the role of the jury in evaluating
the evidence" 179 on a difficult scientific issue, he ought to have some
basis for his conclusion beyond the statements of experts hired by the
winning side. Of course, if non-partisan expert evidence were available,
the temptation to take the issue from the jury in the first place would
have been greatly reduced. 180
One last note. Critics of the use of court-appointed experts-almost
invariably, trial lawyers - argue that this procedure increases the power
of judges alarmingly: "Trial by jury ... becomes no more than an empty
illusion, a shibboleth, to which lip service is paid while its destruction is
endorsed." 181 1 doubt if this argument impresses many judges, but for
one reason or another they do go along with the conclusion: they almost
never appoint expert witnesses. But this hardly represents a conservative
position on the power of judges. They won't seek independent expert
advice, but they will exclude the core of a party's case on the basis of their
lay assessment of its scientific merit. They won't appoint non-partisan
experts to provide information to their jurors, but they will dismiss an
entire class of claims as unsound. At least in the context of toxic torts,
we have come to accept judicial responses to scientific problems that are
both more drastic than the appointment of a witness, and less effective.
Whatever the issue - admissibility or sufficiency or liability- the solution
to the problem of troublesome scientific evidence is more information,
not less, but from a trustworthy source.

Appendix
In the text I predict that if Daubert has any systematic effect on the
treatment of scientific evidence, it will encourage conrts to exclude more
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often than they had done under Frye. It's too early to reach any solid
conclusion, but the first year-and-a-half's worth of federal cases applying
Daubert are consistent with that prediction.
For the most part, these post-Daubert decisions are unsurprising. There
has been a shift, conspicuously in the types of the cases that raise
questions concerning scientific evidence. Cases applying Frye were usually
criminal- until the last several years almost exclusively so (see supra
note 46 and accompanying text)-but most of the cases applying Daubert
are civil. Moreover, there are signs of instability among the civil cases,
especially on appeal. In this respect, Daubert seems to have accelerated
a trend that was already underway.

Criminal Cases
Among reported decisions in federal criminal cases, Daubert has changed
almost nothing. The best defined subgroup consists of cases on the
admissibility of DNA identification evidence. Like all appellate opinions
on point, they let it in. United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1198 (8th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 554 (6th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1156 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Davis, 40 F.3d 1069, 1075 (10th Cir. 1994); Gov't of the Virgin Islands v.
Penn, 838 F.Supp. 1054, 1073 (D. Virg. Is. 1993). Another set of non-path
breaking cases deal with a variety of chemical tests in drug prosecutions.
As before Daubert, their admission, too, is upheld on appeal. United
States v. Bynum, 3 F.3d 769, 773 (4th Cir. 1993)(cbromatographic analysis
is admissible to show that three samples of crack cocaine came from
the same batch); United States v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 380 (5th Cir.
1993)(evidence of Fourier Transform Infrared Spectrophotometer test for
cocaine base admissible at sentencing hearing); United States v. Muldrow,
19 F.3d 1332, 1337 (10th Cir. 1994)(testimony by forensic chemist on
tests to identify cocaine admissible); United States v. Harris, No. 93-5943,
1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 20145 at *5 (4th Cir. 1994)(evidence of field test
for cocaine admissible). Cf. United States v. Lee, 25 F.3d 997, 999 (11th
Cir. 1994)(remand to determine the admissibility under Daubert of trace
evidence of narcotics collected via the Sentor and lonscan machines).
Although Daubert speaks directly only to the admissibility of expert
scientific evidence, several cases cite the standards announced in Daubert
as the basis for approving admission of other types of expert testimony:
United States v. Markum, 4 F.3d 891, 896 (10th Cir. 1993)(expert testimony
by fire chief that fire was caused by arson); United States v. Locascio, 6
F.3d 924, 938-939 (2nd Cir. 1993)(expert testimony by a police officer
on the workings of the underworld); United States v. Muldrow, supra 19
F.3d at 1337-1338 (police officer's testimony on whether possession of
one kilo of cocaine would be for personal use or distribution); United
States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 1487, 1497 (8th Cir. 1994)(expert testimony by
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unindicted coconspirator on gang structure and drug trafficking). See also
United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1183 (1st Cir. 1993)(trial court's
exclusion of improper expert opinion testimony by a police commander on
defendant's roles in cocaine trafficking organization did not necessitate
a mistrial). None of these decisions would likely have been different two
years earlier.
Various types of expert scientific evidence that have traditionally been
considered unreliable were still excluded after Daubert, at least when
offered by criminal defendants: polygraph evidence, United States v. Black,
831 F. Supp. 120, 122 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); forensic anthropology in a robbery
case that turned on identification, United States v. Dorsey, 45 F.3d 809, 814816 (4th Cir. 1995); evidence that the defendant in an attempted extortion
case had had "dependant personality disorder," United States v. Marsh,
26 F.3d 1496, 1502- 1503 (9th Cir. 1994); and expert voice identification,
United States v. Jones, 24 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 1994)(although the
witness was allowed to give lay opinion evidence on the same issue).
By contrast, the admission of testimony by a prosecution expert on a
photogrammetry process for calculating the height of an individual from
surveillance photographs was affirmed, on the basis of the trial court's
finding that the calculations were neither novel nor controversial. United
States v. Quinn, 18 F.3d 1461, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994).
The only post-Daubert criminal cases that were remanded on appeal
dealt with expert evidence on the reliability of eyewitness identification
testimony. In United States v. Amador-Galvan, 9 F.3d 1414, 1418 (9th
Cir. 1993), the Ninth Circuit remanded for a trial-court determination
on whether the evidence qualified for admission under Daubert. And in
United States v. Minnis, No. 93-50330, 1994 U.S. App. LEXlS 14727 at
*4 (9th Cir. 1994), the same court followed Amador-Galvan and ordered
a similar evidentiary bearing. Between these two decisions, in United
States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 923 (9th Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the decision of a different district court that such evidence
was inadmissible under the same standard. It's hard to see any trend
here-in Rincon the court emphasized that it was not setting a general
rule, and that other litigants may meet the criteria for admission for
similar evidence. Daubert seems to have been an occasion for the Ninth
Circuit to make the undramatic statement that at least in some types of
cases, trial judges are required to consider admitting expert evidence on
eyewitness identifications, but having done so in the approved manner
they can admit or exclude the evidence as they please.

Civil Cases
A sizeable minority of the civil post-Daubert cases concern medical
evidence. Two are Bendectin cases: Elldns v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 8
F.3d 1068, 1071 (6th Cir. 1993) in which the Sixth Circuit followed Turpin,
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supra note 20, and held the plaintiff's evidence admissible but legally
insufficient; and Daubert itself on remand, 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995),
in which the Ninth circuit held the same evidence inadmissible under the
new standard. See supra note 60. In both Elkins and Daubert the plaintiff
claimed that the defendants' affidavits were inadmissible under Daubert;
in both the circuit court responded that tms argument misconstrued the
defendant's burden on summary judgment.
Most of the rest of the medical-evidence cases involve other toxic tort
claims, and in most of these the scie ntific evidence was excluded or its
exclusion was upheld: Porter v. Whitehall Laboratories, 9 F.3d 607, 616
(7th Cir. 1993)(summary judgment to defendant ibuprofen manufacturers
affirmed); O 'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090, 1107
(7th Cir. 1994)(summary judgment affirmed in radiation exposure case);
Claar v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 29 F.3d 499, 503 (9th Cir. 1994)(summary
judgment for defendant affirmed on complaint alleging various injuries
from exposure to various chemicals); Sorensen v. Shaklee Corp., 31 F.3d
638, 650 (8th Cir. 1994)(summary judgment for defendant in case alleging
that plaintiffs' birth defects were caused by their parents' consumption of
a lfalfa health food tablets affirmed); B radley v. Brown, 42 F.3d 434, 438
(7th Cir. 1994)(exclusion at bench trial of evidence on Multiple Chemical
Sensitivity); Hayes v. Raytheon Co., No. 92-4004, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
8415 at •11, (7th Cir. 1994)(summary judgment for defendant upheld
in case alleging that video display terminals caused cervical cancer);
Chikovsky v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 832 F.Supp. 341, 346 (S.D. Fla.
1993)(summary judgme nt to manufacturer of acne medication Re tin-A
in birth defect case). See also Wheat v. Pfizer, Inc., 31 F.3d 340, 343 (5th
Cir. 1994)(dictum that testimony linking defendant's drug to plaintiff's
hepatitis would be inadmissible under Daubert; summary judgment for
defendant affirmed on other grounds). On the other hand, in a few
post-Daubert federal toxic tort cases, the scientific evidence was admitted
at trial or on appeal: Cantrell v. GAF Corp., 999 F.2d 1007, 1014 (6th
Cir. 1993)(admission of evidence linking laryngeal cancer to asbestos
affirmed); Glaser v. Thompson Medical Co., Inc., 32 F.3d 969, 975 (6th
Cir. 1994)(exclusion of evidence that Dexatrim can cause hypertension
and summary judgment for defendant reversed); Hopkins v. Dow Coming
Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1125 (9th Cir. 1994)(admission of plaintiff's expert
evidence affirmed in breast implant case).
As a group, the post-Daubert toxic tort cases suggest that (at least in
this context) federal judges are, if anything, more willing than before
to scrutinize and exclude scientific evidence that they see as weak - e.g.,
evidence that is based on "common sense" with no published support,
Chikovsky, supra., 823 F.Supp. at 345-46, or evidence from a witness who
represents a "lone voice" in the scientific community, O'Conner, supra.,
13 F.3d at 1105-1106. The two non-toxic tort medical-evidence cases add
little. Both are medical malpractice cases, and in both the admission

268

SAMUEL

R.

GROSS

of the disputed testimony was affirmed: Cella v. United States, 998 F.2d
418, 425 (7th Cir. 1993)(plaintiff's medical expert allowed to testify to
cause of polymyositis); Ca"oll v. Morgan, 17 F.3d 787, 790 (5th Cir.),
reh'g denied 26 F.3d 1117 (1994)(defendant's expert cardiologist allowed
to testify to cause of death).
The non-medical post-Daubert civil cases are an extremely assorted
group. In most the court excluded or approved the exclusion of testimony
by experts whose qualifications or data were questionable: Joy v. Bell
H elicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 569 (D .C. Cir. 1993)(economist's
testimony on future earning capacity of deceased plaintiff if he had
survived); Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 2 F.3d 183, 186 (7th
Cir. 1993)(accountant's valuation of investments as worthless); Rosado
v. Deters, 5 F.3d 119, 124 (5th Cir. 1993)(accident reconstructionist's
tesimony about motorcycle accident); Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d
1233, 1238 (7th Cir. 1993)(pathologist's testimony that plaintiff's story of
electroshock torture was credible); Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., 11 F.3d 563,
567 (5th Cir. 1994)(economist's testimony on life expectancy of oil rig
workers); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1324, 1354 (6th Cir. 1994)(expert
testimony that failure to discipline police officers caused defendant officer
to shoot plaintiff); Habeck.er v. Clark Equip. Co., 36 F.3d 278, 290 (3d
Cir. 1994)(expert testimony on simulation on forklift accident); American
and Foreign Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 135, 139 (6th Cir.
1995)(affidavit of engineer regarding design of circuit breaker); Stanczyk
v. Black and Deck.er, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 565, 568 (N.D. IU. 1993)(feasibility
of safer rotary saw design); McLendon v. Georgia Kaolin Co., 841 F.Supp.
415, 418--419 (M.D. Ga. 1994)(geologist's testimony on Kaolin deposits);
Israel Travel Advisory Serv., Inc. v. Israel Identity Tours, Inc., No. 92 C 2379,
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13749 at *5, 1993 WL 387346 at *6 (N.D . Ill.
1993)(economic testimony on damages to a business); Liu v. Korean Air
Lines Co., No. 84 Civ. 0690 (PLN), U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16233, at *1-11,
1993 WL 478343 at *1- 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)(economist's testimony on
future earnings of deceased plaintiff, expert restricted but not excluded);
Doe v. Tag, Inc., No. 92 C 7661, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16356, at *3-7,
1993 WL 484212 at *3- 7 (N.D. Ill. 1993)(expert testimony by social
workers and economist excluded, but evidence from MD's admitted, in
civil child abuse case).
On the other side, however, there are several cases in which evidence
on similar issues was admitted, or its exclusion was reversed on appeal:
Petruz.zi's /GA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224,
1240-1241 (3d. Cir. 1993)(affidavits by economists in antitrust case);
United States v. Deccarelt, 6 F.3d 37, 58 (2d Cir. 1993)(expert testimony by
DEA agent on money laundering, in civil forfeiture case); Iacobelli Constr.,
Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 24-25 (2nd Cir. 1994)(affidavits
by experts on underground construction in contract case); Pioneer HiBred Int'l v. H olden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1229 (8th Cir.
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1994)(electrophoresis, liquid chromatography, and growout testing in suit
alleging misappropriation of the genetic make-up of seed corn); Auvil v.
CBS "60 Minutes'', 836 F Supp. 741, 741 (E.D . Wash. 1993)(evidence on
toxicity of apples treated with daminozide).
There is a clear pattern across this entire set of civil post-Daubert
cases. Almost all the action involves plaintiffs' witnesses. For example,
seven of these cases report trial-court decisions: Chikovsky, M cLendon,
Liu, Stanczyk, Israel Travel Advisory Service, Doe and Auvil. As one might
expect, alJ but one (Auvil) are cases in which purportedly scientific
evidence was excluded (although in two of those, Liu and Doe, some such
evidence was admitted as well). What's less predictable and more striking
is that in every case in which evidence was excluded it was offered by
a plaintiff, while in the only reported trial court opinion in which the
scientific evidence was admitted it was offered by the defendant.
The largest well-defined cluster of appellate opinions consists of six
toxic tort cases in which the plaintiffs' scientific evidence was excluded
in the trial court, and the resulting summary judgment for the defendant
was affirmed: Porter, O 'Conner, Hayes, Sorenson, Claer, and Daubert on
remand. If the original Ninth Circuit opinion in Daubert was written
in part to encourage trial courts to clamp down on plaintiffs' experts
in toxic tort cases, its reversal by the Supreme Cou rt opinion has not
stopped federal judges from doing just that. There are no post-Daubert
cases of any sort that involve summary judgment for the plaintiff.
There arc eleven opinio ns in this set that affirm judgments after trial:
six for plaintiffs and five for defendants. With two exceptions, Marcel
and Carroll, these cases are similar in a telling way: they all concern
plaintiffs' witnesses. (Indeed, Maree~ Carroll a nd Auvil are the o nly three
civil post-Daubert cases that involve defense witnesses, regardless of the
issue or the outcome.) When a plaintiff's judgment is affirmed, the
circuit court opinio n upholds the district court's decision to admit the
plaintiff's scientific evidence (Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'~ Daccarett, Cantrel~
Hopkins, Cella); when a defense judgment is affirmed, the appellate court
affirms the decision to exclude the plaintiff's evidence (Habecker, Rosado,
American and Foreign Ins. Co., Chicovsky).
The most interesting pattern of all shows up in the seven cases in
which trial courts were reversed. They fall into two groups: fou r cases in
which a jury verdict for the plaintiff was reversed because of improper
admission of scientific evidence (Frymire-Brinati, Wilson, Berry, Joy), and
three in which summary judgment for the defendant was reversed because
of improper exclusion of plaintiff's expert affidavits (Glasser, Iacobelli
Construction, Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets). In o the r words, sometimes
the trial courts are too lax and let plaintiffs introduce scientific evidence
that should be kept out; when that happens, judgments may have to be
reversed. Other times they go too far in the other direction and exclude
evidence too quickly, on summary judgment; then cases have to be sent
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back to do things the right way. One way or another, judging from these
early reversals under Daubert, the issue of the moment is what to do
about scientific experts who testify for plaintiffs.
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(11th Cir. 1986).
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113. Gimbel v. Laramie, 181 Cal. App.2d 77, 80, 5 Cal. Rptr. 88, 90 (1960)
(citations omitted).
114. Ferebee, supra note 86, 736 F.2d al 1534.
115. In Federal diversity cases, treating the problem of questionable scientific
evidence as an issue of admissibility has another consequence that judges may
like: it enables them to avoid the requirement of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
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